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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF STATE OF IDAHO
RANDY L. MCKINNEY,
Petitioner/Appellate,
-vsSTATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT # 42964-2015

CLERK'S RECORD ON
APPEAL

******************************************************************
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Butte.
Honorable Alan C. Stephens, District Judge, presiding.

******************************************************************
Counsel for Appellant:

Idaho State Appellate Public Defender, Sarah B. Thomas,
3050 N. Lake Harbor, STE 100, Boise, Idaho 83703

Counsel for Respondent:

Office of the Idaho Attorney General, Lawrence G.
Wasden, P.O. Box 83720 Boise, Idaho 83720-0101
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1

Randy L. McKinney, #18329
I . S . C • I. , Unit

2

Post Office Box 14
Boise, Idaho

!'

. \ '-~

,

.l

83707

3
4

5
6

7
8

9

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BUTTE
STATE OF IDAHO

10
11

12

Randy L. McKinney,

)

Petitioner)
.

13
14

15

VS:

16
17
18

State of Idaho,

'

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO.

Petition For Post
Conviction Relief
.'-

Respondent)
19
20

Comes now, Randy L. McKinney, the Petitioner in the case at

21

bar, who submits to this Court this Petition for Post Conviction

22

relief.

23

THE PETITIONER ALLEGES AS FOLLOWS:

24
25

A).

That he is'confined at the Idaho state Correctional

Institution.
-1-
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1

2
3
4

B).

the Seventh Judicial Dtstrict Court, in and f9r Butte County.
C).

The case number under which I was convicted is as follows

CR-1981-38.

5
6

The judgment and sentence in this case was imposed by

The offenses fo~ which I was convicted and sentenced
are as follows:

7

a).Premeditated Murder;

8

b) Felony.Murder;

9

c) Conspiracy to commit Murder;

10

d) Robpery;

11

e) Conspiracy to commit Robbery.

12

D).

The date upon which the sentences were imposed is,

13

The terms of the sentences imposed were as follows:

14
15

a).

Premeditated Murder, Death;

16

b).

Felony Murder, Death;

17

C) •

Conspiracy to commit Murder, Thirty years;

18

d).

Robbery, Fixed life;

19

e).

Conspiracy to commit Robbery, Thirty years,

20

(There was also a consecutive term for the use of a firearm durin

21

the commission of the above offense. This was a 15 year term).

22
23
24
25

E).

The Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and then

proceeded to a Jury Trial.
F).

The Petitioner did appeal from the Judgment and the

Sentence imposed. The Petitioner has filed several different types

-2-
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1

of appellate actions, but the only one which is relevant to the

2

instant case is the case from the Idaho State.. supreme Court which

3

was listed under case number 38527-2011, and for which the

4

Remittitur was issued'~n January 28th, 2013.

5
6

G).

The following are the grounds that I believe clearly

entitle me to Post Conviction Relief.

7

I).

8
9

10

II).
11
12
13
14

15

III).

16
17
18

21
22

H).

The Petitioner has previously filed the following

Petitions/Appeals in the listed Courts:
a).

State V. McKinney, 107 Idaho 180, 687 P.2d 570,
(1984), Direct Appeal from Conviction;

b).

McKinney V. State, 115 Idaho 1125, 772 P.2d 1219,
(1989); Appeal from denial of Post Conviction
Petition.

23

24
25

Whether or not the sentence imposed,. (Whether or
not agreed upon by all parties), is i-llegal, as
there was no provision in the laws, at the time of
the commission of the offenses, for the Court to
impose a "Fixed life" sentence. (The Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to impose such a term)
Whether or not the Petitioner has been denied his
right to the effective assistance of counsel?

IV).

19

20

Whether or not the convictions for felony murder,
robbery, conspiracy to commit Robbery, ,conspiracy
to commit. murder are illegal because they violate
constitutional and statutory prohibitions against
double jeopardy, and multiple punishments for the
same actions?
'
Whether or not upon re-sentencing, and pursuant to
the binding plea agreement, the Petitioner was
sentenced for "premeditated Murder", or was the
Petitioner sentenced for "First Degree Murder"
(Felony_Murder), and to continue to refer to the
sentence and conviction as Premeditated Murder is
not correct and violates Due Process?

-3-
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1

c).

McKinney V. State, 133 Idaho 695, 992 P.2d 144,
(1999); Appeal from denial of Successive Post
Conviction Petition.

d).

McKinney v. state, 143 Idaho 590, 150 P.3d 283,
(2006), Appeal from second successive Post
Conviciion Petition.

e).

McKinney v~ Fisher, 2009 WL 31S1106, *5, (D. Idaho
(2009), Federal Habeas Corpus Petition, which was
granted in part, and lead to the Petitioner being
resentenced.

f).

State V. McKinney, Number 38527, as_ was filed in
the Idaho_ State Supreme Court. This· was from an
appeal on the denial of a Criminal Court Rule 35
Motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Rule
35 Motion was timely filed after re-sentencing,
and th~ above cited appeal was denied on January
3rd, 2013, wherefore this Post Conviction Petition
is timely filed.

2
3

4

5
6

7
8

9

10
11

12

I).

I am alleging that my Counsel failed to adequate

13

represent me during several different stages of these proceedings

14

which are listed herein:

15
16
17
18

aa). Counsel, during the plea negotiations. which lead
to the binding plea, and the re-sentencing in this
case, informed me that I would be re-sentenced to
first degree murder, (Felony Murder), NOT
premeditated murder;
bb).

19

20
21

Counsel ~urin9 the re-sentencing
for not ·arguing
that all of
should have been nu,~rged into the
conviction, and therefore I have
mutiple punishments for the same

was ineffective
the convictions
"Felony Murder"
been given
actions;

cc).

Counsel for the Petitioner failed to recognize
that at the time of the commission of the offense~
Idaho Law provided for the sentence(s) of Death,
or life in prisonment for the crime of first
degree murder. (There was no sentence possible
for a "fixed Life Term", and as such counsel was
ineffective for allowing me to be sentenced at
the time I was re-sentenced, to a term that the
Court lacked statutory authority to impose.

dd).

Counsel failed to consult Petitioner about appeal.

22

23
24
25

-4-
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1

J).

The Petitioner is seeking leave to proceed In Forma

2

Pauperis. That Motion and request is attache~~heretofore, and is

3

properly before this Court.

4

K).

The Petitiorl~r is also seeking leave to have Counsel

5

Appointed to represent him during this process. The Petitioner

6

has also enclosed heretofore the Motion for such a request.

7

RELIEF REQUESTED
8
9

For the reasons as given herein, the Petitioner does request

10

that this Court order chat the terms of the plea agreement which

11

was entered into upon re-sentencing only allows the Petitioner to

12

be sentenced for a Conviction of First Degree Murder,

13

Murder), and NOT First'Degree Premeditated Murder, there being no

14

mention of the word PREMEDITATED within the plea agreement.

15

(Felony

Furthermore, for the reasons as given in this Petition, it

16

is clear that all of th~ underlying crimes should have been

17

merged with the crime of Felony Murder, and this Court should

18

Order as such.

19

Finally, it is clear that at the time of the commission of

20

the offense, Idaho Law did not provide for.a "Fixed Life" term,

21

and based upon this the Petitioner does request that he be

22

re-sentenced to a term of LIFE, and that he be granted credit fo

23

time served herein.

24

The Petitioner would ask this Court to allow the record of

25

this case to incorporate the records on file in the Idaho State

-5-
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1

Supreme Court in case number 38527.

2
3

4

5
6

STATE OF IDAHO)

7

COUNTY OF ADA

8

I, Randy L. McKinney, being duly sworn an placed upon my
oath, depose and state that I have subscribed to the foregoing
Petition; That I know the contents thereof; and that the matters
and allegations therein set forth are true and correct to the
best of my belief and knowledge.

)

9

10

SS:

)

11

12
13

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
14

tl
,

day of

2013.

15
16
17

_-: ·• 1 ·· :.'

the
at,

- :•.Jr 1,, ,.. ,

18

19

20
21

22
23
24
25

-6-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Comes now, Randy L. McKinney, the Petitioner herein, who CertifieE
that he served a true and correct copy of the aforegoing upon the
parties entitled to such service by depositing a true and correct
copy of the enclosed document in the United States Mail, first class
postage pre-paid and addressed as follows:
Clerk of the Court
Seventh Judicial District Court
Butte County Courthouse
Post Office Box 736
Arco, Idaho
83123

Butte County Prosecutor
Butte County Cou~thouse
Post Office Box 736
Arco, Idaho
83213

-~1~-?-e-t-itio_n_e_r
_ __

000012

Randy L. Mckinney, #18329
I.S.C.I., Unit 10
Post Office Box 14
Boise, Idaho
83707

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BUTTE
STATE OF IDAHO

Randy L. McKinney,
Petitioner,

VS:

State of Idaho,
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO.

L>J ~ '2-b \ ~ ~'3

S

Memorandum of Law in
Support of Petition for
Post Conviction Relief

\.

Comes now, Randy L. McKinney, the Petitioner herein, who submits to this Court this
Memorandum of Law in support of the Petition for Post Conviction Relief filed here in.
The issue as to whether or not the Petitioner has been subjected to a
Violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States, and the State of Idaho's Constitution, was submitted to this Court previously, and this Court and the Idaho State Supreme
Court, held that it could not be brought before the Court for

000013

be brought before the Court for review within the context of a Rule
35 Motion.
The Idaho state Supreme Court affirmed this holding, and did not rule upon the merits of the
argument, instead holding that the issue could not be decided in a Rule 35 format, and therein
affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 35 Motion.

The Illegality Of Mr. McKinney's Sentences Did Not Become Clear Until The
November 18, 20q9 Sentencing Hearing For First Degree Murder.

Mr. McKinney's challenges to the legality of his sentences arise from both doublejeopardy/merger violations, as well as violations of Section 18-301. While a person can be
charged with greater and lesser included offenses, and can be found guilty of offenses
arising from the same act, a person cannot be convicted of a greater and lesser offense, and
cannot be punished for the same act in different ways under Section 18-301. See State v.
Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 758 (1991); Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 211-13 (1986). Thus, the

illegality of sentences or punishments for offenses arising from the same act, or for greater
and lesser offenses, does not become clear until sentencing is complete.
It was not until the district court imp'osed a fixed life sentence upon Mr. McKinney for a
single count of first degree murder that his conviction and sentence for robbery became
illegal. If the parties and the court had agreed to vacate Mr. McKinney's first degree felony
murder in the perpetration of a robbery conviction, but otherwise maintain his first degree
murder conviction on the basis of premeditated, willful and deliberate murder, robbery would
not be a lesser included offense of premeditated murder, and Mr. McKinney's sentences for
first degree murder and robbery would not merge.
2

000014

The State had numerous opportunities to avoid this problem, but chose not to. For example, when
charging Mr. McKinney with first degree murder in the criminal information, the State could have limited
the basis for the murder charge solely to premeditated, willful, deliberate murder, rather than including
the alternative of felony murder. Or, when drafting the sentencing agreement, the State could have
sought a stipulation from Mr. McKinney and his counsel to vacate felony-murder in the perpetration of a
robbery as a basis for Mr. McKinney's first degree murder conviction, thereby limiting Mr. McKinney's
first degree murder conviction to a premeditated, deliberate and willful killing. The State simply failed to
do so, even though it drafted the Rule 11 sentencing agreement and such a stipulation would have
been permissible. (R.38527, pp.11-10.)

Similarly, it was not until Mr. McKinney was sentenced for first degree willful,
premeditated, deliberate murder and felony-murder in the perpetration of a robbery, that his
punishment for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder became illegal. (38527 Tr., p.3,
L.25 -pA, LA.) If Mr. McKinney had not been resentenced for first-degree murder, then both
his merger and Section 18-301 claims relating to first degree murder and conspiracy to
commit first degree murder, would never have come to fruition; the imposition of multiple
punishments for a single act which results in more than one conviction, or the possibility
thereof, is what triggers application of Section 18-301. Thus, Section 18-301 claims simply
do not arise until sentencing.

Finally, given the State's knowledge of Mr. McKinney's double-jeopardy and Section 18301 concerns about his convictions and sentences, which Mr. 'McKinney made no attempt to
hide, it should come as no surprise Mr. McKinney maintains these
3
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problems persist even after the sentencing on November 18, 2009. (Answering Br., p.20.)
The illegality of his sentences is not something Mr. McKinney agreed to in the Rule 11
agreement. (38527 R., pp.11-6; 38527 Tr., passim.) While the State seeks to present the
agreement as inuring only to Mr. McKinney's benefit by removing the risk of the penalty of
death, that is simply not the case. Under the agreement, the State was relieved of its burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, thirty years after the crime, Mr. McKinney killed Mr.
Bishop in the perpetration of a robbery, and that he acted with the specific intent to take Mr.
Bishop's life. In addition, the agreement relieved the State of its burden of persuading a jury
that despite decades of good behavior and mountains of mitigating evidence stemming from
Mr. McKinney's history and background, the death penalty would be just. 2 Thus, both parties
benefited from the agreement, and the illegality of Mr. McKinney's sentences did not become
clear until sentencing was complete.

Mr. McKinney's Robbery Conviction Is A Lesser-Included Offense Of First-Degree Felony
Murder And The Two Must Merge

Mr. McKinney was charged with and convicted of first degree murder based on two
alternative means: the willful, deliberate and premeditated murder of Mr. Bishop, and killing
Mr. Bishop in the perpetration of a robbery; he was also charged with and convicted of
robbery for the same offense underlying his felony-murder conviction. (See R.14551, pp.7274, 124-26.)

2 The

agreement also relieved the State, and the County, of the financial burden of paying for
a capital resentencing before a sequestered jury, in a case predating the capital crimes
defense fund. See I.C. 19-2126 (custody of jury during trial); I.C. § 19863A (capital crimes
defense fund authorized in 1998).
4
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It is without question that one cannot be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense. U.S. CONST. amends V, XIV. This prohibition means "a defendant may not be
convicted of both a greater and lesser included offense." Sivak, 112 Idaho at 211 (quoting
State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 433 (1980». Whether the prohibition against double-

jeopardy prevents Mr. McKinney from being punished for both felony-murder in the
perpetration of a robbery, and robbery, depends on whether robbery is a lesser included
offense of felony-murder in his case. If all of the elements needed to support Mr. McKinney's
conviction for robbery are included in the elements needed to support Mr. McKinney's
conviction for felony-murder, then the robbery is a lesser included offense of felony murder.
Id.

Idaho employs the indictment or pleading theory to determine whether an offense
constitutes a lesser included offense.

fd.

According to the pleading theory, if the offense

alleged in the information is a means or element of the commission of the higher offense, the
offense is a lesser included offense and must merge with the greater offense. Id. The Idaho
Supreme Court has held where a defendant's acts committing a robbery create liability under
the felony-murder statute, the robbery conviction is a lesser included offense of the felony
murder and the two offenses must merge. Id. at 208; Pizzuto, 119 Idaho at 756-58. Where a
defendant has already been convicted and sentenced for the greater and lesser offenses, the
district court must vacate the sentence for the lesser offense. Id.

With respect to first degree felony-murder, Mr. McKinney was charged by criminal
information, Count I, as follows:
th

That the defendant, RANDY LYNN MC KINNEY, on or about the 8 day
of April, 1981, at a place located approximately 5 miles north of Arco,
5
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Idaho, and 1 mile east of Highway 93 on a county road in the County of Butte,
State of Idaho, then and there being did then and there ... at a time when the
said defendant was in the perpetration of, or attempting to perpetrate robbery,
kill and murder one Robert M. Bishop, Jr., of Blackfoot, Idaho, a human being,
by shooting said Robert M. Bishop, Jr., in the head with a revolver type
handgun and thereby mortally
wounding the said Robert M. Bishop, Jr., from
th
which he died on the 8 day of April, 1981, in violation of Sections 18-4001 and
18-4003(a) and (d) of Idaho Code.

(R.14551, p.72.) Mr. McKinney's jury was similarly instructed:
In this case, to warrant a verdict of guilty under Count I of the crime of First
Degree Murder by perpetrating, or attempting to perpetrate, Robbery, you
must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that:
1. The defendant, Randy Lynn McKinney;
2. In Butte County, Idaho, on or about April 8, 1981;
3. In the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate Robbery, intentionally
or accidentally shot and wounded with a firearm, and by such
wounding, directly caused the death of Robert M. Bishop, Jr.
These are the essential elements or material allegations of such
crime charged in Count I, and the State of Idaho is required to prove each of
these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

(14551 Tr., p.1603, L.22 -p.1604, L.11; R.14551, JI 27.) With respect to the robbery,
Mr. McKinney was charged by criminal information, Count IV, as follows:
th

That the said defendant, RANDY LYNN Me KINNEY, on Of about the 8 day of
April, 1981, in the County of Butte, State of Idaho, did feloniously and by
means of force or fear, take from the possession, from the person, or from the
immediate presence of Robert M. Bishop, Jr., certain personal property, to-wit:
a wallet containing money and credit cards, and a jacket belonging to Robert
M. Bishop, Jr., and also a 1979 Ford Mustang automobile, the property of
Great Western Financial Corporation d/b/a/ New America Real Estate, all of
which was accomplished against the will of said Robert M. Bishop, Jr., in that
the said defendant threatened to shoot and shot Robert M. Bishop, Jr., with a
handgun. I.C. 8-6501.

(R.14551, p.73.) Mr. McKinney's jury was similarly instructed:

6
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In this case, to warrant a verdict of guilty of the crime of Robbery, Count 111,
you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
1. On or about April 8, 1981, in Butte County, Idaho;
2. Robert M. Bishop Jr. had possession of certain personal property, towit: a wallet, containing credit cards, or a jacket, or a 1979 Ford Mustang
automobile;
3. Randy Lynn McKinney took some of said property from the person, or
immediate presence, of Robert M. Bishop Jr., and against his will;
4. Randy Lynn McKinney accomplished the taking by force or fear and
with the intent permanently to deprive Robert M. Bishop Jr. of the property.
These are the essential elements or material allegations of the crime charged
in Count Ill, and the State of Idaho is required to prove each of these elements
beyond a reasonable doubt.

(14551 Tr., p.1607, Ls.1-18; R.14551, Jl31.)
Mr. McKinney's jury found him guilty of both first degree felony murder in the
perpetration of a robbery, and robbery, as charged in Counts I and IV of the criminal
informatiom (R.14551, pp.72-74, 124, 126.) Mr. McKinney's jury was also instructed
and found him guilty of the willful, deliberate and premeditated murder of Mr. Bishop.
(Tr. 14551, p.1602, L.1 -p.1603, L.20; R.14551, p.123; R.14551, Jl26.)
The criminal information, jury instructions and jury verdicts all reflect
Mr. McKinney's acts in the commission of the robbery created liability under the robbery

The offenses charged in the information do not align with the jury verdicts numerically
because the information was premised on Mr. McKinney and Dovey Small, his codefendant,
being tried together in a single trial. Ms. Small moved to sever her case from Mr. McKinney's
case for trial, while Mr. McKinney moved for a change of venue. The change of venue motion
was granted. As a result, Ms. Small's case remained in Butte County, while Mr. McKinney's
case was transferred to Bonneville County, resulting in a de facto grant of Ms. Small's motion
to sever her trial from Mr. McKinney's trial. (R.14551, pp.93-96.) As a result, Count II of the
criminal information which charged Dovey Small with aiding and abetting Mr. McKinney in
the murder of Mr. Bishop, as well as Count V of the criminal information charging Ms. Small
with aiding and abetting the robbery of Mr. Bishop, became inapplicable to Mr. McKinney,
once he and Ms. Small were ordered to be tried in separate counties by separate juries.

3
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statute, and was the underlying felony constituting the felony-murder charge in Count I. See
also State v. McKinney, 107 Idaho 180, 182 (1984) (Idaho Supreme Court's lengthy

recitation of the facts and circumstances surrounding the offenses "due to the allegations of
error and the imposition of the death sentence."). The State concedes "that, should this Court
address the merits of this claim without the underlying record, robbery merges with
McKinney's conviction for felony-murder." (Answering Br., p.22 n.8.) Thus, Mr. McKinney's
robbery conviction and sentence must be vacated and dismissed on remand."

On The Face Of The Record, Mr. McKinney Cannot Be Punished For Both
Conspiracy To Commit Murder And Murder Under Section 18-301 As Everything Mr.
McKinney Did To Conspire To Kill Mr. Bishop He Did To Kill Mr. Bishop

At the time of Mr. McKinney's offenses, Idaho law precluded him from being punished
multiple times for the same acts, and thus prevented the court from sentencing him for both
murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Section 18-301 provided "an act or omission which
is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished
under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one; an
acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the same act or
omission under any other." (Repealed 1995.) While premised on double-jeopardy principles,
this provision provided even greater protection than the United States and Idaho
Constitutions by precluding multiple

8
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punishments for the same act, not just the same crime. State v. Horn, 101 Idaho 192,
197 (1980); State v. Sterley, 112 Idaho 1097, 1099 (1987) (if a defendant is charged
with two or more crimes arising from the "same act or transaction ... , I.C. § 18-301
provides broader protection against double jeopardy than the State or Federal
Constitution, and it bars punishment for more than one of the crimes charged.").

Whether Section 18-301 applied to a given case depended on whether the Court found a
defendant's acts to be divisible into separate events, a standard that became known as the
"temporal test." Sterley, 112 Idaho at 1099-1100. Under the temporal test, if a defendant's
acts in committing one offense were the same acts necessary for the commission of another
charged offense, a defendant could only be convicted and sentenced for one of the crimes
but not both. Id. at 1100-01. In applying the temporal test, the appellate courts would
specifically look "for separate acts before allowing conviction of two crimes arising out of the
same incident." Id. at 1101.
Idaho appellate courts had the opportunity to consider Section 18-301 iri the context of
multiple punishments for conspiracy to commit a substantive offense, and the substantive
offense itself, on three occasions before the statute was repealed." Ln State

s Those cases where a defendant challenged his or her convictions for two or more
substantive offenses under Section 18-301 are not relevant to Mr. McKinney's argument and
therefore are not addressed here. See, e.g., State v. Garner, 121 Idaho 196 (1992)
(defendant could be punished for three counts of aggravated DUI, all arising from the same
driving act, where there were three victims; Section 18-301 was not intended to prevent
multiple punishments where more than one victim is involved); State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho
415 (1989) (evidence supporting defendant's convictions for statutory rape and lewd conduct
with a minor did not establish sequence of events and same facts supported both
convictions, requiring the sentence for lewd conduct be vacated); State v. Brusseau, 96
Idaho 558 (1975) (once defendant pied guilty to assault with intent to murder and was
sentenced to serve a fourteen-year prison term, under Section 18-301, his ten year sentence
for voluntary manslaughter after his assault victim died, could not stand).
9

000021

V. Gallatin, 106 Idaho 564 (Ct. App. 1984), the defendant challenged his convictions and
sentences for conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance (cocaine), and aiding and abetting
the delivery of a controlled substance (cocaine), arguing he was punished twice for the same
act in violation of Section 18-301. In addressing this claim, the Court first considered the
evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the State. Id. at
568. The Court then looked to the charging information. Id. at 569. After comparing both, the
Court concluded: "[u]pon the state's evidence, everything [the defendant] did to aid and abet
the delivery of the cocaine, he did also in furtherance of the conspiracy. His conduct was one
continuous 'act'. He did nothing more as a principal by aiding and abetting the delivery of the
cocaine than he did in furtherance of the conspiracy." Id. As a result, the Court concluded the
jury's verdict finding the defendant guilty of conspiracy to deliver cocaine included an implicit
finding that an agreement existed to do so, which was not an element inherent in aiding and
abetting the delivery of cocaine. Id.
Because the additional element of an agreement was found by the jury, the Court of
Appeals concluded the conviction for conspiracy should be entered against defendant rather
than aiding and abetting. Id. In doing so, the Court specifically observed: "[o]ur choice of the
crime for which the conviction should be entered, based upon the jury's verdict, is not
governed by the severity of the penalty available for the conviction .... Rather, our decision is
based upon a policy of deterrence arising from enforcement of the crime of conspiracy." Id.

The following year in State v. Sensenig, 110 Idaho 83, 83-84 (1985), the Court of
Appeals considered Section 18-301 in the context of the defendant's convictions for
conspiracy to commit robbery, aiding and abetting robbery, and aiding and abetting
10
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burglary. According to the evidence presented at trial, the defendant met two boys in Salt
Lake City at a Youth Home and offered to give them money in exchange for their help in a
robbery scheme. Id. at 84. The defendant would provide the boys with "knowhow," weapons
and transportation, and in exchange, they would commit the offenses; the boys agreed. Id.
The defendant, his wife and the boys travelled to Pocatello, selected a store, and the boys
committed a robbery. They then travelled to Idaho Falls where they cased some stores but
never robbed any of them. They continued onto Twin Falls where they robbed one store.
Finally, they came to Boise where the defendant enlisted the help of one of the boys to rob a
Boise store. The defendant drove the boy to the Boise store just before closing time,
whereupon the boy entered the store and threatened employees with a gun, took money
from the cash registers, and attempted to flee. Id. at 84. When the boy was caught by police,
he identified the defendant and his involvement in the robbery. Id. As a result, the defendant
was charged with and convicted of conspiracy to rob the Boise store, aiding and abetting
robbery, and aiding and abetting the burglary that happened when the boy entered the Boise
store with the intent to rob it. Id.
On appeal, the defendant argued his convictions violated Section 18-301 because the
conspiracy to commit robbery and the robbery itself stemmed from the same continuous act.
In addition, he argued his convictions for robbery and the related burglary stemmed from a
single act and he could not be punished for both. Id. 84-85.
The Court determined although the acts constituting conspiracy to commit robbery and
aiding and abetting robbery overlapped, they were not identical. Id. at 85. The Court noted
the defendant and the boys agreed to rob stores in several locations,
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and the defendant had engaged in numerous overt acts in Utah, eastern Idaho and
southern Idaho, to carry out the conspiracy well in advance of the Boise robbery. Thus,
the Court found because the defendant committed different overt acts to carry out the
conspiracy to commit robbery, not just those involved in the Boise robbery, his

convictions stemmed from different acts and were not precluded by Section 18-301. Id.
With respect to the aiding and abetting burglary and aiding and abetting robbery convictions,
the Court first observed Section 18-301 permits separate convictions and punishments for
burglary and any theft or felony offense committed thereafter. Id. (citing State v. McCormick,
100 Idaho 111 (1979)). The Court explained because the crime of burglary is complete once
an illegal entry with the intent to commit a theft or felony occurs, the theft or felony that
follows the illegal entry is a separate act. In the defendant's case, the burglary was
committed when the boy entered the store with the intent to commit robbery. Id. The robbery
happened when the boy held up the employees and took the money. Id.
Although agreeing the defendant's participation in the burglary was identical to his
participation in the robbery, the Court concluded the defendant's conduct could not be
considered in a vacuum. The Court observed because Idaho has abolished the distinction
between accessories and principals who commit the offense, when two people act in concert,
the acts of one are imputed to the other. Id. (citing I.C. § 181430). Thus, because the boy
could be convicted of both robbery and burglary, and his actions were imputed to the
defendant, the defendant could also be convicted and punished separately for aiding and
abetting robbery and aiding and abetting burglary despite, Section 18-301. Id. at 85-86.
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Finally, in State v. Sterley, 112 Idaho 1097, 1098 (1987), the defendant was
charged with and convicted of conspiring with his son to deliver a controlled substance
(cocaine), and delivery of the same controlled substance (cocaine). On appeal, the
defendant argued his convictions and sentences for both offenses violated Section 18
301. The Court first reviewed the criminal information, the facts elicited at trial, and the jury
instructions. Id. at 1099-1101. The criminal information identified delivery of cocaine as one
element of the conspiracy to deliver cocaine charge. Id. at 1101. In addition, the trial judge
had instructed the jury that delivery was one of the components of conspiracy. Id. Under
these circumstances, the Supreme Court found "everything [the defendant] did to aid and
abet the delivery of cocaine was also done in furtherance of the conspiracy." Id. As a result,
the Court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to vacate the judgment of
conviction and sentence for either the conspiracy or the delivery offense. Id.
In light of these cases, it is clear that whether Mr. McKinney's acts in killing Mr. Bishop
and in conspiring to kill Mr. Bishop are the same acts under Section 18-301, this Court must
consider: the evidence elicited at trial in the light most favorable to the State; the crimes
charged in the information; and the instructions relied upon by the jury to find Mr. McKinney
guilty of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.
The facts and circumstances surrounding Mr. McKinney's offenses, viewed in the light
most favorable to the State, were set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Mr. McKinney's
direct appeal:

McKinney and his female companion, Dovey Small [who was also separately
tried and convicted and whose appeal is also pending before
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this Court] were traveling from California through Idaho, planning to hitchhike
to Montana or Canada. McKinney carried with him a .22 caliber revolver. While
the pair were in Malad, Idaho, they were joined by Small's sisters, Ada and
Kathy, where McKinney showed his gun and indicated he had entered the "big
time." The group traveled to Blackfoot, where Ada called Bob Bishop (a
stranger to McKinney and Small), who agreed to transport McKinney and
Small to the interstate highway where they could continue their hitchhiking
journey. McKinney stated to Kathy, "I'm going to blow him [Bishop] away."
When Bishop arrived, Kathy warned him about McKinney and his gun, and
indicated that he [Bishop] might get hurt. With a group in Bishop's car,
McKinney, seated in the rear, pointed his index finger at Bishop as if it were a
gun.
At a later time, out of Bishop's hearing, Dovey Small stated that Bishop had a
lot of money and that she and McKinney were going to kill him for some money
because they had to leave Idaho. At a still later time, Small and McKinney
discussed killing Bishop and taking his car, money, and credit cards. Dovey
Small attempted to get one Wheeless to kill Bishop, and, when he refused,
McKinney asked Wheeless to recommend a good place for the killing, which
Wheeless also refused. McKinney then stated that he would "just take him out
on the desert and shoot him and throw some bushes over him and just burn
him so they can't trace him " Dovey Small agreed and urged that they get it
over with quickly.
Bishop drove Dovey Small, Ada, and McKinney to Moore, Idaho, where Dovey
Small and Ada remained. McKinney and Bishop drove to an abandoned gravel
pit, presumably for target practice. While Bishop set up targets, McKinney shot
him through the arm and chest. Then McKinney walked to Bishop and placed
four more shots in the back of Bishop's head. McKinney then returned to
Moore and picked up Ada and Dovey Small. When Ada asked for Bishop,
NlcKinney replied that he had shot him in the stomach and five times in the
head. When Ada expressed disbelief, McKinney took them to the site and
showed them the body of Bishop. Ada was then taken to her home in
Blackfoot. Small and McKinney then drove to Kathy's house, where Dovey
Small stated that McKinney had shot Bishop. Small and McKinney next drove
to Pocatello, Idaho and bought some gas with Bishop's credit card. They then
called Ada to inform her that they were returning to her home, at which point
the police were called. When the police arrived at Ada's home indicating they
had a report that there had been a shooting, Ada told the officers that she had
see·n Bishop's body, that she knew where it was, that McKinney had killed him,
that there was a weapon, and that the weapon was in the car driven by
McKinney.

State v. McKinney, 107 Idaho 180, 182 (1984).
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The basis for Mr. McKinney's first degree premeditated murder conviction is set
forth in the criminal information:
th

That the defendant, RANDY LYNN MC KINNEY, on or about the 8 day of
April, 1981J at a place located approximately 5 miles north of Arco, Idaho, and
1 mile east of Highway 93 on a county road in the County of Butte, State of
Idaho, then and there being did then and there wilfuly, unlawfully, deliberately
and with premeditation and with malice aforethought ... kill and murder one
Robert M. Bishop, Jr., of Blackfoot, Idaho, a human being, by shooting said
Robert M. Bishop, Jr., in the head with a revolver type handgun and
thereby mortally wounding the said Robert M. Bishop, Jr., from which he
th
died on the 8 day of April, 1981, in violation of Sections 18-4001 and 184003(a) and (d) of Idaho Code.
(R.14551, p.72 (emphasis added).)
With respect to conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, Mr. McKinney was
charged by criminal information as follows:
That the defendants, RANDY LYNN MC KINNEY and DOVEY SMALL,
th

on or about the 8 day of April, 1981, in the County of Butte, State of
Idaho, did combine and conspire to commit the following crime against the
people of the State of Idaho: THE CRIME OF MURDER IN THE FIRST
DEGREE. That it was part of said conspiracy that the said defendants
and co-conspirators would commit the crime of Murder in the First
Degree in violation of Idaho Code Sections 18-4001 and 18-4003(a)
and (d).
In furtherance Of the conspiracy, and to affect the purpose thereof, the
defendants and co-conspirators performed the following overt acts: That
the said defendants RANDY LYNN MCKINNEY and DOVEY SMALL
obtained a handgun. They then invited and encouraged one Robert M.
Bishop, Jr., to take them in his automobile from Blackfoot, Idaho, to Arco,
Idaho, and areas around Arco. They then did invite and encourage Robert
M. Bishop, Jr., to take said RANDY MCKINNEY to an isolated place outside of
Area, Idaho, at which time the said RANDY LYNN MCKINNEY took a
handgun into his possession, either loaded or determined that it was in
fact loaded, that he did aim the gun and shoot the said Robert M. Bishop,
Jr., in the chest, that he did then walk toward Robert Bishop and aim the
gun, from very short range, and shoot the said Robert M. Bishop, Jr., four
times in the head. I.C. §18-1701

(R.14551, p.73 (emphasis added).)
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Mr. McKinney's jury was instructed that to find Mr. McKinney guilty of first-degree
murder by willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, they "must find from the evidence,
beyond a reasonable doubt" that: (1) Randy Lynn McKinney; (2) in Butte County, Idaho, on
or about April 8, 1981; (3) with malice aforethought; (4) willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation; (5) unlawfully and intentionally killed Robert Bishop, Jr., a human being, by
shooting and wounding him with a firearm, and by such wounding, directly causing his death.
(R.14551, JI 26.)
In order to find Mr. McKinney guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, Mr.
McKinney's jury was instructed they had to find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that: (1) Mr. McKinney and Ms. Small intentionally agreed to commit the crime of first
degree murder of Mr. Bishop in Idaho; (2) Mr. McKinney and Ms. Small had the specific
intent to commit the crime of first degree murder of Mr. Bishop; (3) During the existence of
the agreement either Mr. McKinney or Ms. Small committed one of the following overt acts in
Idaho to effect the first degree murder of Mr. Bishop: (a) Mr. McKinney or Ms. Small invited
and encouraged Mr. Bishop to take them in his car from Blackfoot to Arco, Idaho and
surrounding areas; (b) Mr. McKinney or Ms. Small invited and encouraged Mr. Bishop to take
Mr. McKinney to an isolated place outside of Arco, Idaho; (c) At that time, Mr. McKinney took
a loaded handgun into his possession;
(d) Mr. McKinney aimed the gun and shot Mr. Bishop in the chest; (e) Mr. McKinney or Ms.
Small aimed the gun and shot Mr. Bishop in the head; and (4) The agreement existed and
any overt acts committed took place on or about April 8, 1981. (R.14551, JI 30.)
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A criminal conspiracy was defined for the jury as "a crime where two or more
persons combine or conspire to commit any crime prescribed by the laws of Idaho, and
one or more of .such persons does any act to further the object of the combination or
conspiracy." (R.14551, JI 24.) Jurors were further instructed all persons who directly
commit the act constituting a crime, or who aid and abet one who directly and actively
commits a crime, or who advise and encourage the commission of a crime, are
principals under the law and are equally guilty of the crime committed. (R.14551, JI 25.)

Applying the temporal test to the facts of Mr. McKinney's case, in light of the criminal
information and jury instructions, it is clear everything he did to kill Mr. Bishop was done in
furtherance of the conspiracy to kill Mr. Bishop. The information charging Mr. McKinney with
conspiracy to commit first degree murder lists five overt acts, the fourth and fifth of which are
acts constituting the crime of first degree murder. Moreover, like the jury in Sterley, Mr.
McKinney's jury was instructed the first degree murder of Mr. Bishop was an element of
conspiracy to commit the first degree murder of Mr. Bishop. (14551 Tr., p.1605, L.18 -p. 1606,
l.24.) In addition, unlike the defendant in Sensenig, none of the overt acts constituting the
conspiracy to kill Mr. Bishop were committed in relationship to any crime other than the first
degree murder of Mr. Bishop.
Consistent with the Court of Appeal's rationale in Gallatin, 106 Idaho at 568, because Mr.
McKinney's jury found the additional element of an agreement, Mr. McKinney's conviction for
conspiracy to commit first degree murder should be entered against him rather than the
conviction for first degree murder. The "choice of the crime for which the conviction should
be entered, based upon the jury's verdict, is not governed by the severity of the penalty
available for the conviction .... Rather, our
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decision is based upon a policy of deterrence arising from enforcement of the crime of conspiracy".
Id. For these reasons, Hr. HcKinney's first degree murder conviction is subsumed by his conviction
for conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and he cannot be convicted and sentenced for both of
these offenses under §18-301.

WAS THE PETITIONER SENTENCED TO THE CRIME OF "PREMEDITATE»"
MURDER, OR UPON RE-SENTENCING WAS THE PETITIONER SENTENCED
FOR THE CRIME OF FIRST DEGREE MUDER? (Felony Murder).
As part of the records of this case, the Petitioner has attached a copy of the verbatim report
of proceedings to this Memorandum of Law.

Exhibit A, as attached heretofore, is a copy of the transcripts of the "Re-Sentencing
hearing" as took place in this case. Clearly, on page 8, the Court states as follows: " .... we are
re-sentencing you on the First Degree murder charge to a term of fixed life .... "

There is no mention of any form of Premeditated murder charge. Simply the First Degree
Hurder charge. (Felony Murder). Based upon this clear language, the Petitioner was not resentenced on the premeditated murder charge. He WAS re-sentenced on the felony murder
charge, and there is simply no ambiguity in the language of the Court.

If in fact there is any type of ambiguity in the sentencing order, it must be resolved in the favor
of the criminal defendant. To do less would be to deny to the Petitioner Due Process of Law.
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AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE INSTANT OFFENSE
WAS THERE A PROVISION IN THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF,IDAHO
WHICH ALLOWED A COURT TO IMPOSE A SENTENCE OF FIXED
LIFE?
The Petitioner entered into a plea negotiation where upon he was re-sentenced to a term of
"Fixed Life".
It is the contention of the Petitioner that at the time of the commission of the offenses
charged, (1981 ), the State of Idaho did not have statutory authority to impose a "Fixed Life"
term.
Under the statutory scheme for the offenses for which the Petitioner stands
convicted, the punishment for the offense of First degree Murder was death, or life
imprisonment.
If a person was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment he would become eligible for
parole release after serving Ten, (10) years of the said same term.
Wherefore, the Petitioner contends that the Court, upon re-sentencing lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to impose the term that it did.
A Court's authority to impose a criminal sentence is contained within the statutory scheme for
the particular offense for which the cr±minal defendant is being sentenced.
A sentence is illegal and is entered without subject matter jurisdiction if it is in excess of
applicable law. State V. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 69 P.3d 153,(2003); State V. Peterson, 148
Idaho 610, 226 P .3d 552, (2010).
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If in fact the Court imposed a "Fixed Life" sentence upon the Petitioner, for a crime that
occurred in the year of 1981, and, if the laws in effect in the state of Idaho in the year of 1981
did not provide for such a sentence, then the Petitioner has been re-sentenced illegally, and
the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to impose such a sentence.

WAS THE PETITIONER DENIED HIS RIGHT TO THE
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING THE
RE-SENTENCING AND PLEA PROCEEDINGS?
The Petitioner has a right to the effective assistance of counsel for his defense. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 a.ce, 2052, (1984).
This right has been expanded to encompass the right to have the effective assistance of
counsel during plea negotiations. Lafler
v. Cooper, 132 a.ce. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398, (2012).
The Petitioner has set out very specific terms in which he has alleged that Counsel was not
effective for his defense. See Petition.
However, above and beyond those issues as listed in the Petition itself, the Petitioner would also
like to add the issue that even though he agreed in the plea agreement to waive any type of
appeal, that due to the serious allegations of the re-sentencing, that counsel
was ineffective for not consulting with the Petitioner about filing an appeal.
This type of action has already been deemed to be ineffective representation. Please see,
Campusano V. United States, 442 F.3d 770,
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(2006).

See also. Roe V.

Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 145 L.Ed.2d 985, (2000); Hodge V. United States, 554 F.3d
372, (2009).

Given the facts of this case, and the clear and compelling evidence of the errors in this case, it is
perfectly clear that Counsel should have consulted with the Petitioner about filing an appeal of the
sentence imposed after the re-sentencing hearing.

CONCLUSION

It is for the reasons as given that the sentence imposed upon the Petitioner must be amended to a
term of "Life", and that the Petitioner be granted credit for time served upon this sentence.

OATH OF PETITIONER

Comes now. Randv L. McKinney. the Petitioner herein, who avers and states that he is the
Petitioner, that he has read the enclosed document, and knows the content thereof and believes it
to be true and correct to the best of his belief.

)/Mv-1 ,1g; ;?013
Randy L. McKinney, Petitioner

Dated
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RESENTENCir

1

2

1 original of the Rr

NOVEMBER 18,

3

THE COURT: All right. Let's take up State

4

of Idaho vs. Randy McKinney. This is the time set for

5

resentenclng. Present on behalf of the State, Steve
Stephens, Butte County Prosecutor's Office. Lamont
Anderson, I presume?
MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

;6
7
8

3

· . sentencing agreement. I would
note, Your Hanoi,
t on Page 3 of the agreement, in
Paragraph 6, Line 3, we have added the number 11 for

4
5

Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f){1)(C). That was a mistake on
my part. The parties have Initialed that change; and

6

then the parties have initialed -- or signed the
agreement on the signature page, Your Honor.

2

7

'9

THE COURT: Idaho Attorney General's Office.

9

;!O

Present on behalf of defendant?
MS. HAMPTON: Teresa Hampton, Your Honor.

10

:12
J3
14

THE COURT: Teresa Hampton from the Federal
Public Defender's Office; Is that correct?
MS. HAMPTON: That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. This Is the time set

12

·16
17

for resentencing. It's my understanding there Is a new
sentencing agreement on this case. Is that correct,
Mr. Anderson?

;

11

'

;!8

19

MS. HAMPTON: No, Your Honor. We're

19

to put you under oath. So if you'd stand and raise your
right hand .

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

20
21
22
23
24

MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, that Is the

25

Court).

Z5

14

going to have a series of questions for you, discuss
this sentencing agreement. Before we do that, I'm going

MR. ANDERSON: {Tendering document to the

~3
1!4
,.

13

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Hampton,
anything you want to add before I get started?

16
17
18

THE COURT: Yes.

22

MR. ANDERSON: That Is correct, Your Honor.

11

prepared to proceed.

If I might approach the bench, Your Honor?

.!1

this -- at least a copy of this earlier, this was a
binding sentencing agreement; Is that correct?

15

MR. ANDERSON: That Is correct, Your Honor.

~O

THE COURT: All right. As I reviewed

8

THE COURT: All right. Mr. McKinney, I'm

(Defendant sworn)
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
All right. Pursuant to a ruling from the Federal
District Court, then, we're here for a resentencing on
the first-degree murder charge. Is that your

4

3

1

understanding?

1 agreement, then, the only thing that we are taking up is

2

THE DEFENDANT: Right.

2

3

THE COURT: I have been provided with the

3

4

Rule 11 sentencing agreement. It does Indicate that you

5 have signed off on that agreement. Have you had a
6

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I have.

8

THE COURT: And Is that, in fact, your

9

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, It is.

1
THE COURT: Okay. Under this sentencing
2 agreement there's a number of conditions that are going
3 to apply, and that's kind of what I want to discuss with

10
11
12
13

THE DEFENDANT: I understand, sir.
THE COURT: Under this agreement, then, the
sentence for the murder charge would be a fixed fife
sentence. Is that your understanding?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. You need to understand

mental health at this time that would have an effect on

14 that you do have the right fo a new sentencing hearing,
15 where you can call witnesses and confront the State's
16 witnesses. The State would also then have the right to

your ability to understand these proceedings?

17

again seek the death penalty under a new sentencing

18

hearing. Under this agreement, then, you waive the

19

right to that hearing. The State also waives the

J you just to make sure you fully understand that. Is
there anything going on with your physical health or
'

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

8
9

signature on Page 6?

0

4

THE COURT: This doesn't change sentencing
5
6 on any of the other original charges in the original
7 sentence. Is that your understanding?

chance to look at this sentencing agreement?

7

the sentencing on the first-degree murder charge. Do
you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Is there -- do you feel like you
need additional time to talk with your attorney or any

20 opportunity to present evidence and also seek the death

other reason why we shouldn't go forward at this time
with a resentencing?

21
22
23
24
25

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. I'm ready to go
forward.
THE COURT: All right. Under this
3 sheets

penalty. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. So again, the
sentencing pursuant to this agreement would be a fixed

life sentence without the possibility of parole. That

Page 1 to 4 of 9
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6

vvuuta oe concurrent to the other sent

2
.3
4

5
6
,7
8
9

'JO
11
:12

~s on the other

charges. Is that your understandin!
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Part of this agreement addresses
your rights on appeal. For example, under this
agreement you would waive any right to appeal the
decision of the Federal District Court. As you know,
the Federal District Court granted in part your petition
for a writ of habeas corpus but denied that In part as
well.
THE DEFENDANT: Right. Yes, sir.
THE COURT: So you're waiving the right to

'13

appeal that decision to the extent it denied you relief

14
15
16

on your other claims. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

F

THE COURT: Are you okay with waiving your
right to appeal that decision?

il8
19

THE DEFENDANT: At this point, yes, sir.

~O

permanent. I mean, once you go forward with that,
that's where we're at ls, you waive that right to
appeal.

t!1

22

THE COURT: Well, it's going to be

3

·nt, then, you're waiving your right
to a presentenei
ort. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir .

4
5
6

THE COURT: Typically I would use that
presentence report to assist me in sentencing. It would
contain Information about your general background and

1 this binding agr,
2

7 prior criminal behavior. So in this case we're not
8 having that presentence report. Do you understand that
9 portion of the agreement?
10
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
11
THE COURT: We talked about appealing the
12 decision from the Federal District Court. That also
13 applies to an appeal on this case. So once sentencing
14 Is entered on this particular charge, you're waiving the
15 right to appeal this sentence pursuant to this plea
16 agreement. Do you understand that?
17
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
18
THE COURT: Is that something that you're

19
20

willing to do?

21

that.
THE COURT: We talked a moment ago about a

22

23

THE DEFENDANT: I understand that.

THE COURT: Often on a sentencing we do have 24

25

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I'm comfortable with

presentence reports prior to sentencing. Pursuant to

25

possible new capital sentencing hearing where the State
would bear the burden of proving and showing aggravating
circumstances. You would have the right to present and

7

8

1

show mitigating circumstances to address that

1

2
3

sentencing. Again, that's not something that we're

2

would like to say regarding this matter before I

going forward with pursuant to this plea -- this

3

pronounce sentence?

4

sentencing agreement; Is that correct?

4

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

5

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Hampton, do you

present any evidence about mitigating circumstances.

5
6
7

8 The State is foregoing a capital sentencing, foregoing
9 the opportunity to seek a death penalty, and not

8
9

6
7

THE COURT: So you're waiving the right to

THE COURT: Is there anything else that you

have anything else?
MS. HAMPTON: No, Your Honor. Thank you
very much.
THE COURT: Mr. Anderson, do you have

0

pursuing evidence as far as aggravating circumstances.

10 anything?

1

So that's part of the effect of this sentencing

11

2 agreement. Do you have any questions about that?
3
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

12
13

i

14

THE COURT: Do you feel like you've had a
full and fair opportunity to ·review this agreement and

THE COURT: Do you think there's anything
discussed?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Do you feel like you've
participated in this sentence agreement freely and
voluntarily?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
4/2012 09:52:38 AM

THE COURT: All right. Mr. McKinney, then,
pursuant to this plea agreement -- or this sentencing

. 17 agreement and based on the record before me, we are

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
else that's part of this agreement that we haven't

THE COURT: Mr. Stephens, do you have
anything else?
MR. STEPHENS: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

15

16

discuss that with your counsel?

MR. ANDERSON: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

18
19

resentenclng you on the first-degree murder charge to a
fixed life sentence without the possibility of parole.

20 That will be consistent -- or concurrent with the other
21 charges on -- the other original charges. So we will do
22

an amended judgment of conviction wherein the sentence

23

on the first-degree murder charge will be fixed life

24
25

without the possibility of parole. All other sentences

will remain the same as previously set out in the

Page5to8of9

000039

2 of 3 sheets

1

ortginal judgment. Do you have any

2

that?

3

~stlons about

THE DEFENDANT: No, sir .. I understand.

'4

MS. HAMPTON: Your Honor, I assume that the
Court will also give credit for time served on those
sentences?

5
i6

7

THE COURT: Correct.
MS. HAMPTON: Thank you.

'10

THE COURT: Credit will be given for time
served on all of those sentences. All right.

11

:,2

'

/3

14

'1

Anything else, then, Ms. Hampton?
MS. HAMPTON: No. Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything else on this,
Mr. Anderson?

'15
16

17
ii8

19

MR. ANDERSON: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Stephens?
MR. STEPHENS: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
(Proceedings concluded)

i;10
}"

22

3 sheets
Page 9 to 9

or 9
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF IDAHO
CASE NO. CR-1981-38

COUNTY OF BUTTE
I,

JACK L.

FULLER, Certified Shorthand Reporter

and Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho, do
hereby certify:
That prior to being examined, all witnesses named
in the foregoing proceedings were duly sworn to testify
to the truth,

the whole truth, and nothing but the

truth;
That said proceedings were reported by me in
machine shorthand at the time and place therein named
and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me and that the
foregoing transcript contains a verbatim record of said
proceedings.
I further certify that I am not related to any of
the parties nor do I have any interest,

financial or

otherwise, in the cause of action of which said
proceedings were a part.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF,

I have hereunto set my hand and

affixed my seal of office this 4th day of January,

--£1L Yil6 _______________

2012.

Jacr:. Fuller, Idaho CSR #762
CSR Expiration Date:
07-10-12
Notary Expiration Date: 04-04~13

000041

Steve L. Stephens
Butte County Prosecuting Attorney
260 West Grand Avenue
PO Box 736
Arco, ID 83213
Telephone: (208) 527-3458
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BUTTE
RANDY L. MCKINNEY
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

CASE NO. CV 13-38

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ANSWER

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through the Butte County Prosecuting
Attorney, and does hereby answer Petitioner's ("Randy L. McKinney") petition for postconviction relief in the above-entitled action as follows:
I.
GENERAL RESPONSES TO RANDY L. MCKINNEY'S POST-CONVICTION
ALLEGATIONS
All allegations made by Randy L. McKinney are denied by the state unless specifically
admitted herein.

II.
SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO RANDY L. MCKINNEY'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS
1.

Answering paragraphs A through C, E and F of Randy L. McKinney's Petition for

Post-Conviction Relief, Respondent admits the allegations contained therein.

Answering

Paragraph D, Respondent cannot admit nor deny the date sentences were imposed and therefore
denies the same, but admits the Petitioner was sentenced on the offenses indicated.
2.

Answering paragraph G, the state denies the conclusory allegations.

ANSWER-I

C00042

3.

Answering paragraph H, asserting previously filed petitions/appeals, the state

admits that the petitioner has filed numerous petitions and appeals for post conviction relief.
4.

Answering paragraph I assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel, the state

denies the allegations.
5.

Paragraph J regarding in forma pauperis request/request for appointment of

counsel, are not factual allegations capable of being admitted or denied.
6.

Paragraph K regarding leave to have counsel appointed to represent him, are not

factual allegations capable of being admitted or denied.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Randy L. McKinney's petition fails to state any grounds upon which relief can be granted.
Idaho Code§ 19-4901(a); I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

To the extent Randy L. McKinney's claims should have been raised on direct appeal, the
claims are procedurally defaulted. Idaho Code§ 19-490l(b).
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Randy L. McKinney has failed to file his petition within the one year statute of limitation
and the claims are now time-barred. Idaho Code§ 19-4902(a).
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Randy L. McKinney's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief contains bare and conclusory
allegations unsubstantiated by affidavits, records, or other admissible evidence, and therefore
fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code§§ 19-4902(a), 19-4903, and 19-4906.

ANSWER-2

000043

WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows:
a)

That Randy L. McKinney's claims for post-conviction relief be denied;

b)

That Randy L. McKinney's claims for post-conviction relief be summarily

dismissed;
c)

for such other and further relief as the court deems necessary in the case.

DATED this 1st day ofMay, 2013.
St~ns~~
Prosecuting Attorney for Butte County

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

\31"

day of May, 2013, I caused a true and correct

copy of the foregoing ANSWER to be placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to:
Randy L. McKinney
I.S.C.I, UNIT 10
PO BOX 14
Boise, ID 83 707

Legal Assistant

ANSWER-3
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lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

- _tya0 .....

$~/ENJl:{

JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

'°R'tit>j Lyh) \J\c.~N~cy'

:-&,t-nt:.

)

Case No.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.

~'TE. Or

I'.?

-:l:~Pr.rto
Respondent

DJ .. '2-o \? · ~q,

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL

IT IS HEARBY ORDERED that the Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of
Counsel is granted and ·

·

%Nd Jc Def~v-

(attorney's name), a duly

licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is hereby appointed to represent said defendant in

all proceedings involving the post conviction petition.
DATED this

21 day of

~

·
, 20..!1_.

Di~~r}-R

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
Revised I0/13/0S
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DIST:RlCT OF
Ph /~·: Si
1
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNfirOli\.BUTTE
RANDY MCKINNEY,

.

Petitioner,

)
)

Case No. CV~ 13-38

)

)
)

V.

)

STA TE OF IDAHO,

)

Respondent.

~ - -..

ORDER

)

)
)

TiilS COURT, havjog reviewed the StipUlation to Continue, and having good

cause therefore;

for the

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Motion for Summary Dismissal be set
of
2014, at Ll_: ~~.m.

tr'~ §ef ·\--,

District Judge

STIPULATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE
. 3.
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CERTIFICATE OF ENTRY

.
·(\I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of August, 2014, I served a true and
conect copy of the enclosed document by mailing, with the correct postage thereonr or by

.11

causing the same to he hand delivered to the following parties:

KELLY D. MALLARD
Mallard Law Office

SIEVE STEPHENS
Butte County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 736
Arco,ID 83213

P.O. Box 50396
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

~.J./1:fl/~
Clerk of the Court

~

Deputy Clerk

STIPULATION AND ORDB.R. TO CONTINUE

·4-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tm: SEVENnI .nJDICIAL DISTRICT~
1: r
l'HE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ittifl? / 9 AM {O: I G
RANDY MCKINNEY,

)

)
.)

Petitioner,

Case No. CV-13-38

FILE&ay~--

)

)

V.

ORDER

)
)
)
)

SiATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)

THIS COURT, having reviewed the Stipulation to Continue, and having good
cause therefore;

for the

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Motion for Summary Dismissal be set
of (hfP'lr, 2014, atlf2_:_£_a.m.
.

/:Z~ay

=--

STIPtn..ATION AND ORDER TO OONTINUB ·
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No. / I / 4

~. 4

CERTIFICATE OF ENTRY
~
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .2 '::i day of Septembei:, 2014, I served a true
and correct copy of the enclosed document by mailing1 with 'the correct postage thereon,
or by causing the same to be hand delivered to the following parties:

KELLY D. MALLARD
Ma.U~d Law Office
P.O. Box 50396
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

S'IEVE STEPHENS
Butte County Prosecutor

P.O. Box 736
Aroo, ID 83213

Clerk of the Court

STIPULATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE
·4-
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BUTIECLERK

PAGE 03/eJ4

TlilS COURT, having reviewed tbe Stipulation to Continue, an.d ltavi.ng good
cause therefore~

lT IS HEREBY OROBRED that Motion for Summary Dismissal be set
2014, at 1.Q.:.ao, .,a.m.

for thetfilbday of Nov.

District Judge

STIPULATION AND 01U)B~ TO CONTINUB
. 3.

Antephens

D

ORIGINAL
000050

BUTTECLERK

Oct. 3. 2014 11:05AM

.J Law

oH:ct

PAGE

No. 72 /6

04/04

P. 4/4

CERTIFICATE OF ENTRY
u1--:.Q;J-0\,,e_v-

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ..fi.: day of-8eptembel, 2014, r seIVed a true
and correct copy of'the enclosed dooummtby majling, With the comet postage thereon,
or by causing the same to be hand delivered to th~ following parties:

KELLY D. MALLARD

STEVE STEPHENS
Butte Cotmty Prosecutor
P.O.Box736
Arco1 ID 83213

Malll{d Law Office

P.O. Box 50396
Idaho Fallst· m 83402

H:j},J

,--;-:::jJ_,
,r-,~7 _j. /'/ ~

1.,_:..~

Clerk of the Court -

··•

STIPULATION AND ORD.BP. TO CONTINUE
-4~
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MALLARD LAW OFFICE, P.C.
Kelly D. Mallard, ISB# 4802
P.O. Box 50396
244 Constitution Way
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 542-0766
Facsimile (208)529-4090
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BUTTE COUNTY

RANDY L. MCKINNEY,
Petitioner ,
V.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-13-0038

NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE PARTY'S
ATTORNEYS, DAN BEVILACQUA, PROSECUTING ATTORNEY FOR BONNEVILLE
COUNTY, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named appellant, RANDY L. MCKINNEY, appeals against the above-

named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court for the Order Granting the State's Motion to
Dismiss entered in the above entitled proceedings on or about the 11th day of December, 2014,
by the Honorable Alan C. Stephens., District Judge.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to
Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(c) (1).

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

D ORIG:NAL
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3.

A preliminary statement of the issue on appeal that the appellant then intends to

assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant
from asserting other issues on appeal.
A.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it granted the State's
Motion to Dismiss?

4.

A reporter's transcript of the following hearing(s) is requested:
A. Butte County Prosecutor's Motion to Dismiss held on November 18th, 2014.

5.

The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's

record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.
A.

6.

Rule 11 Sentencing Agreement dated November 18th, 2014.

I certify:
A.

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter,

Mary Ann Elliott;
B.

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee

because the defendant has previously completed an affidavit and the Court has found him to be
an indigent prisoner who is represented by appointed counsel, KELLY D. MALLARD, Mallard
Law Office acting as Butte County Public Defender, that appellant is without funds for payment
of the reporter's fees and therefore, pursuant to I.C. §31-3220 and §31-3220A and Idaho
Appellate Rule 24(e) the payment of the reporter's fees should be waived by the district court;
C.

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for

preparation of the record because defendant has previously completed an affidavit and the Court
has found him to be an indigent prisoner who is represented by appointed counsel, KELLY D.
MALLARD, Mallard Law Office acting as Butte County Public Defender, and that appellant is
without funds for payment of the preparation of the record and therefore, pursuant to LC. §31-

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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3220 and §31-3220A and Idaho Appellate Rule 27(e) the payment of the preparation of the
record should be waived by the district court;

D.

That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because the

defendant has previously completed an affidavit and the Court has found him to be an indigent
prisoner who is represented by appointed counsel, KELLY D. MALLARD, Mallard Law Office
acting as Butte County Public Defender, and that appellant is without funds for payment of the
appellate filing fee and therefore, pursuant to I.C. § 31-3220 and §31-3220A and Idaho Appellate
Rule 23(c) the payment of the appellate filing fee should be waived by the district court;
E.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to Idaho Appellate Rule 20, and the attorney general of Idaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1),
Idaho Code.
Dated this

:\11,

jJ_ day of December, 2014.
aw Office
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

::th

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of December, 2014, I served a true and
correct copy of the document described below on the party listed below, by mailing with the
correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be hand-delivered.
DOCUMENT:

NOTICE OF APPEAL

PARTIES SERVED:

STEVE STEPHENS
Prosecuting Attorney's Office
Butte County
P.O. Box 736
Arco, ID 83213
Mary Ann Elliott
Court Reporter
P. 0. Box 171
Arco, ID 83213

Lawrence Wadsen
Attorney General
Appellate Division
State House, Room 210
Boise, ID 83 720-1000
SARAH B. THOMAS
Appellate Public Defender
3050 N Lake Harbor Ste. 100
Boise, ID 83703
Randy Mckinney IDOC # 18329
ISCI Unit 10
P.O. Box 14
Boise, ID 83707
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL D1~RICT 4', .
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BUTTE .
-------·----~?
RANDY L. MCKINNEY,
Petitioner,

)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Case No. CV-13-0038

ORDER APPOINTING STATE
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
AND WITHDRAWING COUNTY PUBLIC
DEFENDER FOR APPEAL

The above named defendant appeared before this Cqurt Post Conviction Relief. The petition
was dismissed.
The defendant has requested the aid of counsel in pursing a direct appeal from the Judgment
of Conviction in this district court.
The Court being satisfied that said defendant is a needy person entitled to the services of the
State Appellate Public Defender for purposes of appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 19-852 and 19-854
and the services of the State Appellate Public Defender are available pursuant to Idaho Code §19863A;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, in accordance with Idaho Code §19-870, that the State

Appellate Public Defender is appointed to represent the Defendant on appeal.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the appointment of the Butte County Public Defender is
hereby withdrawn for purposes of appeal. The appointment of the Butte County Public Defender
shall continue for all purposes other than appeal unless such appointment has been previously
tenninated by court order.

:\V'

DATED this {O

R....b'

1):)6

day of Decembcr,..lO++

Alan C. Stephens, District Judge

ORDER-1
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ORIGINAL

--------------------t-t6-rr00·061

CERTIFICA'IE OF SERVICE

.
'(L~ Qfl)/5
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this l t>aay of December, 26£4, l served a true and correct
copy of the attached ORDER APPOINTING STA'IE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER AND
WITHDRAWING COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR APPEAL by placing a copy in the United
States mail, with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be hand delivered to the
following parties:
SARAH B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
3050 N. Lake Harbor, STE 100
Boise, Idaho 83703

KELLY D. MALLARD
Bonneville County Public Defender
Bonneville County Courthouse Box
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 .

STEVE STEPHENS
Butte County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 736
Arco,ID 83213

Mary Ann Elliott
Butte County Court Reporter
P.O. Box 171
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

LAWRENCE WADSEN
State of Idaho Attorney General
Appellate Division
State House, Room 210
Boise; ID 83 720-1000

SUPREME COURT/COURT OF APPEALS
P0Box83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101

Randy Mckinney IDOC # 18329
ISCI Unit 10
P.O. Box 14
Boise, ID 83707

ORDER-2
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*************************************************************************
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

************************************************************************
RANDY L. MCKINNEY,
Petitioner/Appellate,
-vsSTATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT# 42964-2015

CERTIFICATION OF
EXHIBITS

I, SHELLY SHAFFER, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Butte, do hereby certify, list and describe the
following exhibits which were offered or admitted during the proceedings in the aboveentitled case:
EXHIBITS/APPENDICES

TITLE
NONE
IN WITNESS WHEREO~ have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said
court at Arco, Idaho, this
d~
day of May 2015.
SHELLY SHAFFER, Clerk of the Court

By~

. · ~
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*************************************************************************
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

*************************************************************************
RANDY L. MCKINNEY,

SUPREME COURT# 42964-2015
Petitioner/Appellate,
-vs-

CERTIFICATION OF
CLERK'S RECORD

STATE OF IDAHO
Respondent.

I, SHELLY SHAFFER, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Butte, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing record in the above-entitled case was compiled and bound under my direction,
and is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings, documents and papers designated to be
included in the clerk's record by the Idaho Appellate Rule 28, the notice of appeal, any
notice of cross-appeal, and any designation of additional documents to be included in the
clerk's record.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said
court at Arco, Idaho, this c:61i~day of May 2015.
SHELLY SHAFFER, Clerk of the Court

~+

Deputy Clerk

000064

****************************************************************
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF STATE OF IDAHO

****************************************************************
RANDY L. MCKINNEY,
Petitioner/Appellate,
vs.
DANIEL BOONE WISEMAN,
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT # 42964-2015
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, SHELLY SHAFFER, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Butte, do hereby certify I personally served or mailed, by
United States mail, one copy of the clerk's record and the reporter's transcript in the above-entitled
case to each of the attorneys of record, to wit:
Appellant's counsel: Idaho State Appellate Public Defender, Sara B. Thomas, 3050 n. Lake Harbor,
STE 100, Boise, Idaho, 83703
Respondent's counsel: Office of the Attorney General, Lawrence G. Wasden, P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said court at
Arco, Idaho, this

a:fiA-

day of May 2015.

SHELLY SHAFFER, CLERK
Clerk of the District Court

By

~
Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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